French Policies toward Central Eastern Europe: Not a Foreign  Policy Priority, but a Real Presence by Tulmets, Elsa & Cadier, David
DGAPanalyse
Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider (Hrsg.)
Otto Wolff-Direktor des Forschungsinstituts der DGAP e. V.
May 2014 N° 11
French Policies toward Central 
Eastern Europe: Not a Foreign 
Policy Priority but a Real Presence
By Elsa Tulmets and David Cadier
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the German Council on Foreign 
Relations.
DGAPanalyse 11 | May 2014
1
French Policies toward Central Eastern 
Europe: Not a Foreign Policy Priority but 
a Real Presence
By Elsa Tulmets and David Cadier
Summary
The study maps the political, economic, and cultural relations between France 
and the Central Eastern European countries ten years after the EU’s 2004 eastern 
enlargement. It shows that, although France has not officially or explicitly elevated 
the region to the status of  a foreign policy priority, there is a real French presence 
in the region. As a general rule, France has been prioritizing the development of  
relations with the biggest Central Eastern European countries (and markets) and 
with the most francophone ones. The paper illustrates this by analyzing France’s 
recent investment in its bilateral relationship with Poland. This relationship has 
witnessed significant developments—first and foremost in the field of  defense and 
security—and bears great potential. The paper concludes by discussing what the 
ongoing Franco-Polish rapprochement means for the Weimar Triangle dynamic 
and for EU foreign policy, in particular in the context of  the Ukraine crisis.
DGAPanalyse 11 | May 2014
2
Contents
Introduction .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 3
France’s Long Road toward Integrating the CEE Region into Its Foreign Policy .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 3
1) A Paternalistic Approach after the Fall of the Berlin Wall  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 3
2) Establishing More Balanced Relations after Accession to NATO and the EU? .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 5
The Development of a Special Relationship with Poland  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7
1) Political Engagement in an Evolving Regional Context  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7
2) Partnerships and Potentials in Security and Defense  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 9
3) Russia, the Ukraine Crisis, and the Weimar Triangle  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 10
Conclusion  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 11
Notes  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 13
DGAPanalyse 11 | May 2014
3
French Policies toward Central Eastern 
Europe: Not a Foreign Policy Priority but a 
Real Presence
By Elsa Tulmets and David Cadier
Introduction
After the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, France reacted 
very cautiously to the political and economic 
changes in the east and insisted on setting a series 
of  conditions to allow Central Eastern European 
countries (CEECs) to join the European Union. 
For several years, French companies were also 
reluctant to invest in CEECs—countries that at 
the time had the same “country investment risk” 
as African countries. Even after the CEECs were 
set to become member states of  the EU, political 
relations remained underdeveloped and, in fact, 
somewhat deteriorated at the time of  the Iraq crisis. 
However, the rapid reform course set down by the 
CEECs themselves managed to convince French 
actors of  the importance of  this region composed 
of  ten EU member states. These states joined the 
EU in 2004.
Ten years after the EU’s eastern enlargement, has 
Paris integrated these new actors into its European 
policy? Is the recent endeavor to reinvigorate and 
upgrade bilateral ties with these countries, promoted 
by conservative as well as socialist presidents, a lasting 
strategy? What are the motivations behind it? After 
reviewing the history of  relations between France and 
the CEECs in the 1990s and 2000s, the analysis will 
focus on Franco-Polish relations, which have recently 
experienced substantial developments not only in the 
field of  defense and with regard to EU foreign policy 
but also in other areas as well.
France’s Long Road toward 
Integrating the CEE Region into Its 
Foreign Policy
1) A Paternalistic Approach after the Fall of 
the Berlin Wall
Relations before the end of the Cold War
During the Cold War, relations between France and 
the CEECs were reduced to a minimum. There 
was some contact with CEE populations, as some 
students managed to study in France and as some 
people migrated to France both temporarily and 
permanently, especially from Poland after the 
imposition of  martial law in 1981. But economic 
ties were marginal. At the end of  the 1980s, at the 
time of  perestroika when some economic reforms 
were initiated in Hungary and Poland, France 
started to develop initiatives aimed at supporting 
these reforms. Some meetings were also organized 
with oppositional movements, like the famous 
meeting between President François Mitterrand 
and Czechoslovak dissidents—including Václav 
Havel—at the French embassy in Prague, and the 
French president’s visits in June 1989 to key Polish 
cities like Warsaw but also Gdańsk—the city where 
the Solidarność movement started.1 In June 1989, 
a few months before the fall of  the Berlin Wall, 
the G7 Arche summit of  Paris decided to launch 
a European program called PHARE—Pologne, 
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Hongrie, Aide à la Restructuration Economique 
(Poland, Hungary, aid for economic restructuring)—
designed to offer concrete help to the reforms initi-
ated in these two countries. This program went on 
to become the key EU assistance program for all 
CEECs.
The key role of aid policy in the enlargement context
While France had played a major role in organiz-
ing some assistance for economic restructuring 
in the CEECs in June 1989 through PHARE, it 
later proved more reluctant to pursue the path of  
an enlargement of  the European community, as 
proposed and mainly supported by the German 
government. In 1992, President Mitterrand clearly 
stated that negotiations could not open up unless 
concrete conditions were defined at the EU level. 
The result of  the French-German compromise 
was the definition of  the “Copenhagen criteria” of  
1993: the candidates would have to respect political, 
economic, and legislative conditions and adopt the 
whole EU acquis communautaire before acceding 
to the EU.2
In parallel to PHARE, the French government 
under Mitterrand defined a small assistance mis-
sion, called Miceco, which only lasted from 1991 
to 1993. Some foundations were also created, like 
the Fondation France-Pologne and the Fondation 
France-Hongrie, which aimed at fostering contacts 
and exchanges at the bilateral level in supporting 
projects and giving study grants to students. In the 
eyes of  the CEECs, however, these efforts did not 
assuage the strong impression made by France’s 
initial wariness—not only of  German reunification 
but also of  the EU integration of  countries that 
had been seen as pro-German before the Iron Cur-
tain fell over Eastern Europe.3
Limited economic relations
Economic relations between France and the 
CEECs took time to develop. It is surprising to 
note that, for several years (and at least until the 
change of  government in France in 1995), the 
CEECs’ investment risk was evaluated as being 
equivalent to those of  some African countries.4 
Many French companies have nonetheless invested 
in CEECs, mainly in the countries with the biggest 
markets—Poland, Hungary and the Czech Repub-
lic—but also in Romania and Slovenia. In 2004, 
at the time of  the CEECs’ EU accession, French 
investment was the third largest (about 6 percent), 
after German (25 percent) and Italian (10 percent) 
investment.5 Investment took off  once the CEECs 
had genuine EU accession perspectives. Between 
1993 and 2004, for example, France invested 
around 2.73 billion euros in the Czech Republic, 
and in 2004 it was the fourth major investor after 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria—mainly 
in the fields of  the auto industry (Peugeot-Citroën, 
PSA), banking sector (Société Générale), water 
and the environment (Vivendi/Veolia), glass (St 
Gobain), transportation (Eurovia, Renault), dairy 
products (Danone), and construction (Lafarge). 
Between 2000 and 2005, France even held first 
place in terms of  investment in Poland, mainly 
investing in the fields of  telecommunication 
(France Télécom, Vivendi), food services (Car-
refour, Auchan, Casino), electricity (Electricité de 
France), banking (Crédit Agricole), construction 
(Lafarge), electrical engineering (Thomson Multi-
Média), and tourism (Accor).6 Overall, investment 
has mainly been motivated by geographical proxim-
ity, positive political and economic changes, good 
working qualifications, and infrastructure.
An active cultural policy
Cultural relations have been traditionally rather 
good between France and the CEECs. France 
has pursued a very active cultural policy, opening 
French institutes (Instituts français) and schools in 
almost all capital cities from the beginning of  the 
1990s onward. Language courses as well as study 
and research grants are offered, film and music fes-
tivals are organized, and prominent French thinkers 
are invited speak in the countries’ most important 
universities. The French Civilization Center at the 
University of  Warsaw has roots that go back to the 
1950s, and a Czech-French research center in social 
sciences (Centre français de recherche en sciences 
sociales, or CEFRES) was established in 1991 in 
Prague. In general, academic cooperation between 
French and CEEC research institutions is quite 
active.
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2) Establishing More Balanced Relations 
after Accession to NATO and the EU?
One would have expected French policies toward 
the CEECs to be reevaluated after these countries 
joined NATO (between 1999 and 2004) and the 
EU (in 2004 and 2009). This was certainly the 
case within official discourse. In practice, however, 
French politicians continued to devote little atten-
tion—and to attach little importance—to the EU’s 
eastern members. Recent developments, however, 
suggest that a shift of  perceptions might be taking 
place among French policymakers, at least as far as 
the biggest newer member states are concerned.
The war in Iraq as a context for the deterioration of 
bilateral relations
The first CEECs to join NATO—Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary—were actively 
engaged in supporting US and NATO activities 
on European soil and in participating in some of  
NATO’s missions abroad after they had joined the 
alliance. For example, they played a role as facili-
tators during the Kosovo intervention of  1999. 
Hungary allowed the use of  its military bases and 
opened up its airspace to overflights. At the time 
of  the US operation in Iraq, the three countries 
decided, after intense internal debates, to support 
the intervention. Politicians from the region—
many of  them previous dissidents—either signed 
the “Letter of  the Eight” or the “Vilnius letter,” 
both of  which were meant to demonstrate explicit 
support for US actions and thus took a clear stance 
against Franco-German opposition to the interven-
tion. This move on the part of  the CEECs, who 
had in the meantime become members of  the EU, 
prompted an admonition from President Jacques 
Chirac: “You missed a great opportunity to remain 
quiet.” The oft-quoted comment left its mark on 
CEEC capitals, where Chirac’s annoyance was 
interpreted as paternalistic and pejorative. More 
profoundly, it was also the mark of  different CEE 
foreign policy orientations, of  different strategic 
cultures and of  different interpretations of  history.7
Proposing strategic partnerships
When Nicolas Sarkozy (a politician with partly 
Hungarian origins) took up the French presidency 
in 2007, he tried to repair not only the damage 
caused by Chirac’s quip but also the negative 
image of  France that had spread throughout Cen-
tral Europe after President François Mitterrand 
initially opposed EU enlargement.8 In a speech 
given in his father’s country, Hungary, he coun-
tered the idea of  a Europe divided into “old and 
new” and “big and small” EU countries—delib-
erately debunking language that US Secretary 
of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld had used in 2003, 
which seemed to embody the US understanding 
of  Europe at the time.9 To prove France’s open-
ness to the concerns of  “new” member states, 
Sarkozy proposed the negotiation of  “privileged” 
partnerships—or Strategic Partnerships—with 
detailed “Action Plans” with seven countries, in 
particular in the fields of  energy, environment, 
security, immigration, education, and culture. 
One such partnership was signed with the Czech 
Republic on June 16, 2008. In May 2008, Sarkozy 
also announced in Poland that the French market 
would be open to the Eastern partners almost a 
year ahead of  schedule.10
At the same time, however, the “new” member 
states remained sensitive to certain mistakes that 
undermined the credibility of  these valuable steps. 
These included the cancellation of  state visits 
to the Baltic states in favor of  a trip to Moscow. 
Similarly, there has been no French will to orga-
nize official visits at the highest level in Slovakia 
since the country’s independence. Bilateral rela-
tions with Romania, traditionally good on the cul-
tural level, have been fraught on the political level 
by the issue of  Roma population mobility and 
related negotiations on accession to the Schengen 
Area. This was also the case with Bulgaria. Rela-
tions with Hungary have been very tense since 
the arrival to power of  Viktor Orbán in 2010 and 
his government’s efforts to push through contro-
versial constitutional reforms. For many analysts, 
these reforms go against both French economic 
interests and fundamental EU values.11
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With the victory of  the French Socialist Party in 
2012, President François Hollande and Foreign 
Minister Laurent Fabius announced that relations 
with the CEECs would be relaunched, particularly 
in the economic domain. Strategic Partnerships 
have since been renegotiated, and action plans have 
been concluded with all CEECs except Estonia.12 
Partnerships with Slovakia and Poland were signed 
on October 29, 2013 and November 29, 2013, 
respectively, and they define priorities at all sectoral 
levels. Several official visits have also been orga-
nized with the aim of  reinforcing bilateral coop-
eration: Hollande went to Slovakia in November 
2013; an “excellent” dialogue was developed with 
the Baltic states on Common Security and Defense 
Policy (CSDP); there have been official Hungarian 
visits like that of  Foreign Minister János Martonyi 
to France in early 2013 (although there have been 
no reciprocal visits since 2010 for political reasons). 
Martonyi’s visit enabled France to secure Hungar-
ian support for the French military operation in 
Mali and for the launch of  the EU Training Mis-
sion (EUTM) there.13
EU Council presidencies as windows of opportunity 
for reinforcing bilateral relations
Paris and Prague did not hide their divergent views 
on a number of  issues linked to their successive 
presidencies of  the EU Council (in 2008 and 2009, 
respectively), and the transition was marked by ten-
sions.14 The same was true for France and Hungary 
during Hungary’s 2011 Council presidency, in the 
aftermath of  which Alain Juppé declared, “there 
is a problem with Hungary.”15 French cooperation 
with Slovenia, Poland, and Lithuania, on the other 
hand, seems to have been smoother in terms of  
preparation for those countries’ respective council 
presidencies (2008, 2011, and 2013). Two examples 
of  the political divergences between French and 
eastern European views of  EU foreign policy are 
the fact that Mirek Topolánek, the Czech prime 
minister, asked his deputy prime minister for 
European affairs, Alexandr Vondra, to represent 
him at the French-led EU summit on the Union 
for the Mediterranean (July 13, 2008), followed by 
Sarkozy’s own refusal to attend the Czech-led EU 
summit on the Eastern Partnership (May 7, 2009).16 
In order to show a more constructive approach 
than their conservative predecessors, the Socialist 
government decided that Hollande would person-
ally attend the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit 
in November 2013, together with Laurent Fabius 
and Thierry Repentin, the deputy minister for 
European affairs—whereas only the French prime 
minister had attended the Prague Summit in 2009. 
One has also to mention that CEECs, especially 
the Baltic States, have actively participated in the 
French-led mission in Mali.17
Nevertheless, the preparation of  the council 
presidencies has made these countries work more 
closely than ever. This has taken place through 
regular bilateral meetings, mainly at the ministerial 
and administrative levels. For every EU presidency 
held by a CEEC, France has been very engaged 
in training diplomats and civil servants, who have 
benefited not only from French language courses 
with the support of  the Organisation internatio-
nale de la Francophonie (OIF) but also from the 
institutional coordination of  EU issues within the 
framework of  programs organized by the École 
Nationale d’Administration (ENA) and other 
French institutions.18 Numerous joint seminars 
and consultations took place among civil servants 
from different ministries, and secondments (i.e. 
exchanges) were organized for diplomats, which 
have at last made it possible for France and the 
CEECs to work together more closely.19
Cooperation on EU presidencies has also had a 
positive effect in terms of  economic and cultural 
cooperation. In the case of  the Czech Republic, it 
can be noted that bilateral trade and economic rela-
tions experienced renewed dynamism from 2007 
on. The French-Czech-Swedish council presidency 
trio, as well as fulfillment of  the Action Plan of  
the Franco-Czech Strategic Partnership, created 
a window for enhanced economic cooperation.20 
Certainly the “Czech-French Economic Year” (July 
2008–June 2009) contributed to enhancing last-
ing cooperation in various economic sectors, as 
it involved all possible actors—from the public 
spheres of  the chambers of  commerce, embas-
sies, and regions to the private sphere of  the firms 
themselves. No less than thirty bilateral events—
from the launch of  the “first Czech-French tech-
nological forum” to the “Journées économiques 
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tchèques” in France in October 2008, and from 
the exchange of  interns in French and Czech com-
panies to the development of  clusters (pôles de 
compétitivité)—contributed to intensifying coop-
eration on key topics like industry and technology, 
transportation and infrastructure, agriculture, sup-
port to small and medium-size companies, and the 
like.21 Nevertheless, these constructive steps have 
been affected by a major Czech decision that has 
alienated France, namely the rebuttal in 2012 of  a 
bid by the French conglomerate Areva to modern-
ize the Temelín Nuclear Power Station in Western 
Bohemia.22
As far as cultural relations are concerned, a close 
look at the joint cultural programs proposed by 
the CEECs and France indicate that these relations 
have also intensified during respective EU CEEC 
presidencies,23 although these institutions, as well 
as academic ones like the French-Czech research 
center CEFRES, have seen major cuts within the 
context of  budgetary reforms of  French diplomacy.
The Development of a Special 
Relationship with Poland
The salient novelty and most important component 
of  France’s policies toward the CEECs clearly con-
cern Poland. Since Hollande’s accession to power, 
Paris has sought to invest in its bilateral relation-
ship with Warsaw, and this relationship has in fact 
undergone significant developments over the last 
two years. The level and frequency of  political 
consultations and official visits has clearly intensi-
fied. Since his election in May 2012, Hollande has 
travelled three times to Warsaw. On the Polish side, 
President Bronisław Komorowski made a state visit 
to France in May 2013—the first visit by a Pol-
ish president since 2000—and Radosław Sikorski, 
the Polish foreign minister, was invited to attend 
the annual ambassadors’ conference in France in 
August 2013. The Franco-Polish rapprochement 
has been made possible by the evolution of  the 
regional context and necessary with regard to the 
two actors’ EU strategies.
1) Political Engagement in an Evolving 
Regional Context
France’s bilateral relations with Poland remained 
underdeveloped in the 2000s, perhaps even less 
developed than France’s relations with other 
CEECs. Dealings were often marked by mutual 
distrust. Poland was both the biggest and the most 
Atlanticist of  the EUs new member states—in a 
context where the 2004 enlargement had been met 
with skepticism among French governing elites 
and where the polarization over the US interven-
tion in Iraq served as a defining and structuring 
moment for European foreign policy.24 The erosion 
of  this polarization, Poland’s “European turn,” and 
France’s “reconciliation with Atlanticism” brought 
about a much more favorable context in the late 
2000s, however. Poland, pushed by external as 
well as domestic factors (from the re-balancing of  
US foreign policy priorities away from Europe to 
the economic modernization agenda of  the Pol-
ish Centre-Right government that was elected in 
2007), has been striving to consolidate its position 
in the EU.25 Facilitated by the country’ steady eco-
nomic growth, this investment materialized in the 
development of  a niche of  specialization, such as 
the Eastern Partnership, but also more broadly in a 
will to install the country at the core of  European 
integration. Both of  these goals require recogni-
tion from—and constructive relations with—the 
other big member states. For its part, France has 
also been concerned by the prospect of  US disen-
gagement—though not from European but from 
international politics. In response, it has sought to 
reinforce its strategic ties with Washington and to 
act on its call to see Europe take a greater share of  
the international security burden. This has trans-
lated into a greater disposition toward interventions, 
in US-led “coalitions of  the able and willing” or 
by itself, both of  which require generating support 
and contributions from other EU member states.26
The convergence of  France’s and Poland’s parallel 
foreign policy evolutions will open the way for the 
enhancement of  a bilateral political relationship 
that, in light of  the historical and cultural ties unit-
ing the two countries, had been at an abnormal low. 
The signing of  a Franco-Polish Strategic Partner-
ship in 2008 represented a first step in this direc-
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tion. Missed opportunities and tensions around 
specific dossiers under the Sarkozy presidency 
meant, however, that rapprochement was slow 
to take off. The main source of  discord revolved 
around European economic governance and 
Paris’s resolve to limit new integration initiatives 
to the Eurozone core, which was de facto exclud-
ing Poland. Other points of  divergence included 
the share of  the cohesion policy in the new EU 
budget, the East-South rivalry in the allocation 
of  the resources of  the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP),27 and Paris’s disappointment at the 
lack of  support—whether political or military—for 
military intervention in Libya by most EU member 
states, including Poland.
The atmosphere changed with the election of  a 
new French president in May 2012, which created 
new momentum. The new administration came 
to office with the conscious will and deliberate 
strategy to invest in the bilateral relationship with 
Poland. François Hollande had in fact visited 
Warsaw as a presidential candidate. Most impor-
tantly, Paris made concrete gestures toward Poland, 
notably signaling a greater willingness to associate 
non-Eurozone members in discussions about the 
common currency and amending its stance on the 
cohesion policy in the EU budget negotiation.28 
The latter allows Poland to continue to be an 
important beneficiary of  this policy in the 2014–
2020 budget framework, an outcome for which 
Warsaw has been grateful and that has contributed 
to bettering relations between the two countries.29
The evolution of  the EU context made such rap-
prochement not only possible but also necessary. 
While Sarkozy had worked in close coordination 
with Germany during the first years of  the Euro-
zone crisis, Hollande sought to distance himself  
from Germany’s push for austerity policies. To 
advance its growth agenda as an alternative, to har-
ness support for its proposals on further integra-
tion in the Eurozone and on the introduction of  
solidarity mechanisms, but also, more profoundly, 
to consolidate its leadership potential within an 
increasingly inter-governmental EU, France was 
keen to forge new partnerships. Beyond the real-
ization that Poland is emerging in its own right as 
an important player in EU politics, a closer bilat-
eral relationship with Warsaw is serving several 
objectives in this context. Firstly, Paris wishes to 
reach out more to the CEE member states—and 
Poland, as an informal leader of  this group, can 
help generate support for French proposals among 
them. Secondly, Poland can serve as a key partner 
in generating leadership at the EU level on issues 
where Germany is less active (e.g. common security 
and defense) and thus where the “Franco-German 
motor” cannot be activated.30 Thirdly, enhancing 
bilateral ties with Poland can, in fact, also be a way 
for France to add greater weight to the French 
side of  the Franco-German tandem, since Berlin 
has been enjoying privileged bonds with Central 
European countries. As for Poland, a rapproche-
ment with Paris is seen as a means to increase its 
clout in the EU and to be recognized as one of  the 
central payers. As one Polish diplomat put it, “we 
expect France to help us be in the first core of  EU 
integration.”31 It also represents an indirect way for 
Poland to get closer to Germany, which has been 
at the heart of  its EU and foreign policy strategies 
over the last years.32 In other words, the German 
variable is an important one in the new Franco-
Polish equation, although the two actors do not 
attribute the same functions to it.
Concretely, the Franco-Polish rapprochement has 
taken the form of  several initiatives. On Novem-
ber 29, 2013, Hollande travelled to Warsaw with 
several French ministers (of  defense, external trade, 
agriculture, ecology & energy, and European affairs, 
among others) to attend the Franco-Polish inter-
governmental summit, a series of  high-level con-
sultations that the authorities of  the two countries 
vowed to hold annually. On this occasion, the two 
governments signed a new Strategic Partnership, 
essentially pledging to better coordinate their posi-
tions with the EU and providing a detailed road-
map on how and where to deepen their bilateral 
cooperation. Of  the several issue areas identified, 
security and defense is certainly the one domain 
around which the Franco-Polish rapprochement is 
gathering steam.
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2) Partnerships and Potentials in Security 
and Defense
As with other areas of  their bilateral relationship, 
the Franco-Polish cooperation in the field of  secu-
rity and defense has long been characterized by 
divergent preferences, discrepant initiatives, and 
missed opportunities. It has, however, recently 
developed around three pillars: development of  
CSDP; interoperability within NATO; and the 
defense industry.
Throughout most of  the 2000s, France has been 
the main advocate for the development of  Euro-
pean defense through the CSDP framework, while 
Poland remained very wary of  an initiative that it 
perceived as presenting the risk of  marginalizing 
the US from European security.33 In the framework 
of  the foreign policy adjustment described above, 
however, Poland has “taken a U-turn” on CSDP 
and increasingly sees it as an opportunity both to 
consolidate its position within the EU and to maxi-
mize its security guarantees. Thus, in the run-up 
to its 2011 EU council presidency, Poland made a 
number of  proposals to re-invigorate EU defense 
cooperation, including some it had opposed in the 
past, such as the prospect of  a permanent EU mili-
tary headquarters.34
As France shared this overall objective and had 
pushed for some of  these very initiatives in the 
past, one would have expected Poland’s newfound 
enthusiasm for CSDP to lead to a deeper coop-
eration between the two countries. It came, how-
ever, at a moment when France’s own enthusiasm 
about the possibilities and prospects of  European 
defense seemed to be eroding. The Lancaster 
House Treaty concluded with Great Britain in 2010, 
while certainly not incompatible with a strong 
CSDP, nonetheless indicated France’s readiness 
to consider, if  not to favor, other defense coop-
eration formats. The Libya intervention not only 
confirmed the strength of  these bilateral strategic 
ties but also nurtured disappointment in Paris with 
regard to other European member states who did 
not support the operation.35 The Polish govern-
ment refused to join NATO’s deployment; its core 
national interests were not at stake, and it was 
reluctant in an election year to face public opinion 
widely opposed to the intervention. Polish diplo-
mats, moreover, have privately deplored the lack 
of  transparence and consultations surrounding the 
operation.36 Prime Minister Donald Tusk publicly 
questioned the intent of  France and the UK in 
Libya, which contributed to straining relations  
with Paris.37
Here, too, Hollande’s election helped create a new 
momentum. In the new 2013 Strategic Partnership 
agreement, the two states pledged to work together 
to “increase the visibility, the efficiency and the 
political of  role of  the CSDP.”38 At a time when 
none of  the EU’s other big member states seem 
committed to such a goal, the Franco-Polish part-
nership has indeed an important role to play, and 
the potential to do so. It is true that divergences 
on the overarching purpose of  the CSDP and on 
the scale and target zone of  its deployments have 
not been fully reconciled. France conceives of  the 
CSDP as an instrument for projecting force, while 
Poland sees it more as an integration mechanism 
and as a framework for European capacity develop-
ment. The priorities and expectations with regard 
to out-of-area operations sometimes differ, too; 
the contribution of  19 Polish trainers to the CSDP 
mission in Mali (EUTM) is seen by Warsaw as a 
significant gesture toward France (since Poland has 
no interests in the region), while Paris perceives 
it as meager (since France is bearing most of  the 
costs of  the operation).39 Nevertheless, there is a 
convergence and increased cooperation between 
the two countries on the issue of  development 
and mutualization of  capabilities (“Smart Defense” 
and “Pooling and Sharing”). A “building blocks” 
approach on these matters, supported by both 
France and Poland, appears today as one the few 
available paths to develop CSDP. It was, in fact, 
one of  the few areas where the 2013 European 
Council on Defense made concrete progress.40
The new dynamic in defense cooperation 
between France and Poland is maybe even more 
salient—and potentially more significant—out-
side of  CSDP. Both countries are committed to 
increasing inter-operability of  European armed 
forces, particularly within NATO. They were, for 
instance, the two main contributors to NATO’s 
Steadfast Jazz, a large-scale military exercise con-
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ducted in November 2013 in Poland and in the 
Baltic States.41 Indeed, the fact that Paris sent 1,200 
military personnel to take part in this exercise 
(compared to the 120 participants sent by Wash-
ington and 55 from Berlin) probably constitutes 
the most significant development in Franco-Polish 
strategic relations in recent years. It does not sim-
ply demonstrate the commitment of  France and 
Poland to NATO’s operational capacity and to the 
inter-operability of  European armed forces. It is 
also highly symbolic in the sense that the region of  
deployment and the scenario of  the exercise clearly 
related to the security interests of  the CEECs. In 
this regard, Warsaw received it as a strong and posi-
tive signal.42
Finally, the defense industry is another area where 
Franco-Polish ties have the potential to develop 
further. Poland is engaged in large-scale plans of  
modernization of  its armed forces by 2022. This 
prospect makes the country an important strategic 
partner for Paris, as does its political support for 
CSDP and its operational capacity within NATO.43 
The modernization plans for the Polish army rep-
resent important contract opportunities for French 
armament firms but also opportunities for joint 
industrial projects between the two countries. 
In this regard, the tender for the construction of  
Poland’s missile defense system appears particularly 
significant. For this project, a national endeavor 
separate from the US missile defense system (in 
which Poland will also take part ), Warsaw will 
be choosing between four bidders: the American 
firm Raytheon, a consortium led by the American 
company Lockheed Martin, the Israeli group Rafael, 
and a consortium of  the French company Thales, 
the Polish Defense Holding, and the European 
group MBDA.44 The decision, which is expected 
before the end of  the year, will be highly symbolic 
and potentially revelatory of  Poland’s defense 
orientation; regardless of  its price and regardless 
of  technical considerations, the American offer is 
often seen in Warsaw as representing greater secu-
rity guarantees. In this sense, the recent crisis in 
Ukraine is likely to increase Poland’s demand for 
such guarantees and might well contribute to tip-
ping the balance toward this American offer.
3) Russia, the Ukraine Crisis, and the 
Weimar Triangle
While defense is certainly the most prominent 
area, it is not the only domain in which France 
and Poland have sought to develop their bilateral 
cooperation and, where possible, coordinate their 
positions at the EU level. The Strategic Partnership 
agreement identifies a number of  other domains 
such as trade, agriculture, industry, social policies, 
justice, culture, energy, and climate change. The lat-
ter two in particular have seen increased exchanges. 
Poland’s endeavor to diversify its energy mix—
and, in particular, its plan to build its first nuclear 
plant by 2024 (and a second by 2035)—repre-
sents opportunities for French investments and 
expertise.45 Furthermore, France and Poland have 
attempted to coordinate their respective presiden-
cies of  the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (2013 and 2015 respectively).
Overall, while the Strategic Partnership agreement 
provides a roadmap for deeper cooperation, it 
remains largely declaratory at this stage. The level 
of  political and strategic consultations has undeni-
ably increased and intensified, but putting flesh 
on the bone of  the Franco-Polish partnership 
will depend on political will, on concrete projects, 
and on external events. In that sense, the recent 
developments in and around Ukraine mean that 
the question of  EU policies toward Russia and 
the Eastern Neighborhood is likely to emerge 
as an important stress test for the Franco-Polish 
rapprochement.
The topic of  EU-Russia relations is only men-
tioned briefly and in rather vague terms in the 
Strategic Partnership agreement. France and Poland 
vow there to work together toward the elabora-
tion of  a “coherent and united” European policy, 
one that “take[s] into account the interests of  the 
Union.”46 This general wording is meant in fact 
to mask substantial divergences on Russia. Surely 
their positions are not as antagonistic as they might 
have been in the last decade. Poland has adopted 
a much less confrontational stance toward Russia 
in the EU since the late 2000s, and the two most 
recent French presidents have been more critical 
of  Vladimir Putin’s regime than Chirac was. Yet the 
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fact remains that, for understandable historical and 
geopolitical reasons, the evaluations in Warsaw and 
Paris of  the threat posed by Russia to European 
security and the views on the means to address it 
are largely discrepant.
It remains to be seen whether the Ukraine crisis 
will contribute to crystallize, deepen, or narrow 
these divergences. On the one hand, the recent 
events are certainly likely to increase Poland’s 
sensitivity toward Russia and to lead it to adopt a 
tougher stance within the EU and within NATO. 
In fact, Warsaw’s aforementioned change of  atti-
tude on Russia was not the result of  a re-evaluation 
of  its security interests or of  the potential threat 
posed by Russia but came from a change of  tactic: 
adopting a more constructive stance on Russia was 
perceived as a means of  getting closer to Germany 
and consolidating Poland’s position within the 
EU.47 (These goals were in themselves partly per-
ceived as additional security guarantees, as empha-
sized above). Thus, a shift in Russia’s policies is 
likely to bring a new amendment of  this tactic; 
since the Ukraine crisis, Poland has been forcefully 
requesting the deployment of  NATO troops on its 
soil. (The Foreign Minister demanded “two heavy 
brigades” in early April).48 
On the other hand, the nature and magnitude of  
the crisis could also lead France to adjust its own 
position on Russia. While the Eastern Neighbor-
hood had not been among its top priorities until 
now, Paris has been particularly active on the 
Ukraine crisis. Quite tellingly, this has included 
demonstrating solidarity with Poland’s security 
concerns and those of  the Baltic states: France 
sent four fighter jets within the framework of  the 
enhanced NATO air policing mission launched 
over these countries in late April 2014.49 More gen-
erally, Paris has taken an active role in coordinating 
the EU response, notably within the framework of  
the Weimar Triangle. The question lingers, however, 
of  whether this should be read as a crisis-manage-
ment policy or whether it might inaugurate a more 
structured attention toward the Eastern Neighbor-
hood. In any case, France and Poland are likely to 
remain at odds on some of  the regional dossiers, 
such as the question of  providing Ukraine with an 
EU membership perspective.
While the events in Ukraine have the potential to 
strain Franco-Polish relations by exposing diver-
gences on Russia, it could also be argued that these 
relations might benefit from the ongoing consoli-
dation of  the Weimar Triangle and from the rein-
forcement of  its role in EU external relations. The 
Weimar format seems indeed to have been given 
a new lease on life since last fall’s German elec-
tions and in the context of  the Ukraine crisis. The 
foreign ministers of  the three countries conducted 
a mediation mission in Kiev on February 20-21 
and released two common statements on the situa-
tion in the country (on February 28 and March 31, 
2014). 
Indeed, the Weimar Triangle appears as a promising 
format, one that could give an impulse to leader-
ship on EU-Russia relations if  the three countries 
manage to coordinate in spite of  their divergences. 
Germany’s is probably the most potent European 
voice in Moscow; France has both a long history of  
diplomatic interaction with Russia and the ability 
to act as informal leader of  southern EU member 
states; Poland has both recognized expertise on 
the Eastern Neighborhood and the ability to act 
as an informal leader of  the CEE member states. 
An enhanced role for the Weimar Triangle is also 
made possible by the Franco-Polish rapproche-
ment and might in turn contribute to reinforcing 
this dynamic. This format has long been the forum 
for coordinating two strong bilateral relationships 
(Franco-German and Germano-Polish) rather than 
a genuine triumvirate: by consolidating the third 
“face” of  the Weimar Triangle, the development 
of  France’s bilateral relationship with Poland can 
strengthen the format’s foundations and contribute 
to giving it new momentum and new possibilities 
in providing leadership in EU external relations.
Conclusion
Only the future will tell whether President Hol-
lande’s policy toward the region will be sustained 
and whether it will bear fruit. In this regard, the 
recent investment in the relationship with Poland 
is particularly significant and potentially indica-
tive. France is now thoroughly integrating Poland 
into its EU strategy and looks to develop partner-
DGAPanalyse 11 | May 2014
12
ships in certain areas. Security and defense is one 
area that has seen major and potentially long-term 
developments, such as the joint commitment to 
NATO’s Exercise Steadfast Jazz and the prospects 
in terms of  arms industry contracts and coopera-
tion. The Ukraine crisis certainly represents a stress 
test for the Franco-Polish rapprochement, as it has 
the potential to exacerbate divergences on Russia 
and the Eastern Neighborhood. So far, France and 
Poland have managed to pass the test, cooperating 
in particular on this dossier within the framework 
of  the Weimar Triangle. The latter can both con-
tribute to reinforce and be reinforced by a beefed-
up Franco-Polish partnership. France should seek 
to activate this format more and potentially attempt 
to establish links with the Visegrad Group as a 
whole in order to carry forward and give substance 
to its nascent policy of  engagement in Central 
Europe.
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